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SEX CHANGES EVERYTHING, BUT THE TRADEMARK
DILUTION REVISION ACT SHOULDN’T: V SECRET
CATALOGUE, INC. V. MOSELEY AND THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN TRADEMARK DILUTION ACTIONS
Greg Horn* & Matthew Malm**

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, an advertisement ran in a weekly publication distributed to
the residents of Fort Knox, Kentucky declaring the “GRAND OPENING
Just in time for Valentine’s Day” of a new store called “VICTOR’S
SECRET” in nearby Elizabethtown, Kentucky. 1 According to the
advertisement, the store would be selling: “Intimate Lingerie for every
woman,” “Romantic Lighting,” “Lycra Dresses,” “Pagers,” and “Adult
Novelties/Gifts.” 2
The advertisement offended an army colonel (the Colonel) residing at
Fort Knox, and he sent a copy of the advertisement and a letter to the
owners of the “Victoria’s Secret” trademark, V Secret Catalogue Inc.
(Victoria’s Secret). The letter indicated the Colonel’s belief that
Victor’s Secret used Victoria’s Secret’s “trademark to promote the sale
of ‘unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.’” 3 Later, in an affidavit, the
Colonel stated that his wife and daughter shop at Victoria’s Secret, and
he was “dismayed by [the] defendant’s effort to associate itself with,
trade off on the image of, and in fact denigrate a store frequented by
members of [his] family.” 4 The owners of the store, the Moseleys,
changed the name of their store to “Victor’s Little Secret,” but this

* Contributing Editor, 2010–2011, University of Cincinnati Law Review; University of
Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. expected May 2011; Miami University, B.S. Business, 2008. This
author would like to thank the owners and staff of Uncle Woody’s for tolerating him doing all of his
work there. In addition, this author would like to thank the editorial staff of the Law Review for their
efforts.
** Contributing Editor, 2010–2011, University of Cincinnati Law Review; University of
Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. expected May 2011; University of Cincinnati, B.A. Economics, 2008.
This author would like to thank his mother for her unwavering support as well as the editorial staff for
their insights.
1. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003).
2. Id.
3. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 386 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting the
Colonel’s letter), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604).
4. Id. at 391.
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change did not satisfy Victoria’s Secret. 5
The Colonel’s letter spurred litigation that was in the federal court
system ten years before a resolution was reached. Victoria’s Secret
initially brought suit in the federal District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky, alleging that the Moseleys infringed on its trademark and
also diluted the distinctiveness of its trademark. 6 The district court
granted summary judgment for the Moseleys on the infringement claim
because it found consumers were not likely to confuse the name
“Victoria’s Secret” with the name “Victor’s Little Secret.” 7 This is
because, according to the court, consumers were unlikely to associate
Victoria’s Secret products with those available in the Moseleys’ store. 8
The district court did, however, find that the use of “Victor’s Little
Secret” was likely to dilute Victoria’s Secret trademark. 9 This was
because, according to the court, the distinctiveness of the trademark and
the reputation behind the mark were likely to be diminished by the use
of a phrase so similar to “Victoria’s Secret.”
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
decision and reiterated that Victoria’s Secret only needed to show a
“likelihood of dilution” of its trademark’s distinctiveness. 10 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiff
seeking an injunction for dilution must show “actual dilution.” 11 After
the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution
Revision Act (TDRA), which stated that only a “likelihood of dilution”
need be shown. On remand, the district court found a likelihood of
dilution. 12 The Sixth Circuit, in the case that is the focus of this
Casenote, affirmed, 13 but it also held that when a defendant’s trademark
has lewd or sexual associations a “likelihood of dilution” is presumed
and must be rebutted by the defendant. 14 This burden shift was
unprecedented.
5. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at *1 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 9, 2000).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *4.
8. It is not likely that a consumer will think Victor’s Secret is a male-centric offshoot of the
Victoria’s Secret retail chain.
9. Moseley, 2000 WL 370525, at *6.
10. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2001).
11. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003), superseded by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
12. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 750 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
13. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604).
14. Id. at 389.
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This Casenote discusses the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in V Secret
Catalogue v. Moseley and argues that it is setting an unacceptable
precedent. Additionally, this Casenote argues that the Sixth Circuit
should have used a narrow interpretation of the TDRA and, therefore,
should not have shifted the burden of proof. Part II describes trademark
dilution generally and the federal statutes prohibiting it. Part III outlines
the procedural history of V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley. Next, Part IV
analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s 2010 decision in more detail. Finally, Part
V demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s decision is unfavorable and why
a narrow interpretation of the TDRA would have produced a better
outcome. Prospectively, this Casenote is intended to provide courts
interpreting the TDRA with some additional considerations.
II. TRADEMARK DILUTION
The history of trademark dilution law extends over an eighty year
period. During this period, the law evolved from an abstract idea in a
law review article into a federal statute. The following provides a brief
description of this evolution and discusses the substantive aspects of
federal dilution law.
A. Origins of Trademark Dilution Law
The theory of trademark dilution originated in The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection by Frank Schechter. 15 Schechter contended that
“the true harm of diluting junior marks” 16 was not consumer confusion
but “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon noncompeting goods.” 17 Accordingly, Schechter felt the only rational basis
for a trademark’s protection should be the preservation of its
uniqueness. 18
Schechter’s proposal remained a purely academic consideration until
1947 when Massachusetts passed a statute protecting trademarks from
dilution. 19 By 1996, twenty-eight states had adopted antidilution
statutes and at least one had recognized antidilution protection as part of
15. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
16. A junior mark is created when a trademark is used by a second (or subsequent) person.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW DICTIONARY part III-31 (13th ed. 2011). A senior mark is the first user
of a mark and has superior rights to all others. Id. at part III-41.
17. Schechter, supra note 15, at 825.
18. Id. at 831.
19. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997).
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its common law. 20
The fact that trademarks had a national scope and that antidilution
statutes only extended as far as the borders of the state in which they
were enacted posed significant problems. First, the statutes varied
widely in the standards required to prove dilution. 21 Second, many
statutes defined the category of trademarks protected against dilution
solely by reference to their “distinctive quality,” which left many
trademarks unprotected. 22 Third, a likelihood of dilution was actionable
under many statutes. 23 Fourth, many statutes considered the harm to be
damage to a senior mark’s distinctiveness rather than economic harm to
the holder of the senior mark. Fifth, injunctive relief was the only
potential remedy against the use of a junior mark under many statutes. 24
Finally, the injunctions were only statewide. A solution to these borderspecific remedies was to provide national protection under a federal
statute. 25
B. Trademark Dilution Receives a Federal Mandate
In 1995, H.R. 1295 was introduced and the Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a oneday hearing on it. 26 The committee’s report stated that the “purpose of
H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion.” 27 The Senate took up the House
bill by unanimous consent and without debate, passed it on a voice vote
on December 29, 1995. 28 In 1996, this bill became the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which made dilution law enforceable
on a nationwide level.
The FTDA entitled the owner of a famous trademark “to an injunction
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.” 29 Dilution was described
20. Id.
21. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032.
22. Ringling Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Trademark Dilution Bill Cleared for White House, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 3, 1996.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
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in the statute as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.” 30 A
trademark was deemed famous if it was widely recognized by the
consuming public as a designation of the source of the goods or services.
This was determined by the extent of the trademark owner’s advertising,
the extent of the sales of the goods and services under the trademark,
actual recognition of the trademark, and how the trademark was
registered. 31
C. Congress Amends the FTDA with the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act
The federal circuit courts were split over the proper interpretation of
the FTDA’s requirement that a plaintiff seeking an injunction show that
another’s use of its trademark “causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of [that] mark.” 32 Some circuit courts interpreted this provision to
require only a likelihood of dilution, 33 while others interpreted it to
require actual dilution. 34 As discussed further in the next Part, the
Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. 35 In Moseley, the Supreme Court concluded that the
FTDA required a showing of actual dilution. 36
In 2006, Congress, due to unhappiness with the actual dilution
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Moseley, amended the
FTDA. The new law, the TDRA, required only a likelihood of dilution.
The TDRA provides:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution

30. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
32. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003), superseded by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
33. Ringling Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
34. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
35. 537 U.S. 418.
36. Id.
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by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence
of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury. 37

Furthermore, the TDRA defines “dilution by blurring” as an “association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 38 The TDRA
gives a non-exclusive list of factors a court should consider in
determining whether there is dilution by blurring: (1) the degree of
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous trademark;
(2) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous
trademark; (3) the extent to which the owner of the famous trademark is
engaging in substantially exclusive use of that trademark; (4) the degree
of recognition of the famous trademark in the marketplace; (5) whether
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with
the famous trademark; and (6) whether there was any actual association
between the mark or trade name and the famous trademark. 39
“Tarnishment” under the TDRA is defined as an association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous
trademark that impairs the reputation of the famous mark. 40 While
similar, blurring is mainly concerned with protecting famous
trademarks’ distinctive characteristics, which are helpful for
distinguishing their products and services in the marketplace, while
tarnishment is mainly concerned with the reputational aspect of owners
not wanting their famous trademark associated with something that is
considered unwholesome. 41

37. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
39. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
40. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
41. See Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that defendants’
display at an adult entertainment exhibition of two models riding a VIAGRA-branded missile and
distributing condoms would likely harm the reputation of Pfizer’s trademark); Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v.
Friendfinder, Inc., No. C 06-6572 JSW (MEJ), 2007 WL 4973848, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007)
(noting that defendants’ use of the POTTERY BARN trademark on their sexually-oriented websites
likely to tarnish “by associating those marks for children and teenager furnishings”); Kraft Foods
Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that pornographic
website’s use of “VelVeeda” tarnishes VELVEETA trademark); Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that defendants’ internet
trade names likely to tarnish famous trademark when websites “will be used for entertainment of a
lascivious nature suitable only for adults”); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
1620, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (linking BARBIE with pornography will adversely color the public’s
impressions of BARBIE); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (noting that defendants’ use of “The Polo Club” or “Polo Executive Retreat” as an adult
entertainment club tarnished POLO trademark); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q.
124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (noting that defendant’s sexually-oriented variation of the PILLSBURY
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Courts often look to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(the Restatement) for support in resolving antidilution issues. According
to the Restatement, antidilution statutes are designed to protect
trademark owners from two general threats. 42 First, a distinctive
trademark can be a powerful selling tool when the trademark brings a
positive association between the trademark and the goods or services
sold by the trademark’s owner. 43 When other people use the trademark,
it blurs the effect of that positive connotation harming the use of the
trademark as a selling tool. 44 The second threat is similar to the first, in
that when a trademark is used with goods or services, such as
pornography, that use may tarnish the trademark’s image and thereby
lessen its value as a selling tool. 45
In Part III, the procedural history of the Moseley litigation will show
how the TDRA has changed the law regarding dilution by showing how
the case proceeded to the Supreme Court pre-TDRA and how the courts
treated the claim on remand post-TDRA.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY BEFORE V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC. V.
MOSELEY
A. The Facts
Victoria’s Secret has owned its trademark since 1981. 46 They sell a
wide array of lingerie, clothing, and other accessories geared towards
women. 47 Victoria’s Secret operates over 750 stores nationwide and the
Victoria’s Secret Catalogue distributes 400 million copies each year,
including 39,000 in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. 48 They spent over $55
million in 1998 on advertising and were ranked the ninth most famous
brand in the apparel industry. 49 In February 1998, the Moseleys opened
“Victor’s Secret” in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, selling a wide variety of
DOUGHBOY tarnished plaintiff’s trademark); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that pornographic depiction of a Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleader-style cheerleader in an adult film tarnished the professional mark of the Dallas Cowboys).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(c) (1995).
43. Id. § 25 cmt. (b).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also id. at (g).
46. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at *1 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 9, 2000); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://tess2.uspto.gov/, serial number 73159253,
registration number 1146199.
47. V
Secret,
2000
WL
370525,
at
*1;
Victoria’s
Secret,
Careers,
http://www.victoriassecret.com/CustomerService/Company/Careers (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
48. V Secret, 2000 WL 370525, at *1.
49. Id.
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items, including men’s and women’s lingerie, adult videos, sex toys, and
“adult” novelties. Two Victoria’s Secret stores were located within
sixty miles of the Moseleys’ store.50
The Moseleys placed an advertisement in a weekly publication
distributed to residents of Fort Knox, Kentucky. They advertised the
“GRAND OPENING Just in time for Valentine’s Day!” of their store
Victor’s Secret in nearby Elizabethtown. 51 The ad featured “Intimate
Lingerie for every woman,” “Romantic Lighting,” “Lycra Dresses,”
“Pagers,” and “Adult Novelties/Gifts.” 52 An army colonel who saw the
advertisement, was “offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to
use a reputable company’s trademark to promote the sale of
‘unwholesome, tawdry merchandise’ sent a copy of the ad, along with a
letter, to Victoria’s Secret.” 53
B. Procedural History
1. Moseley I
On February 25, 1998, the Moseleys received a cease and desist letter
from Victoria’s Secret. 54 The Moseleys subsequently changed the store
name to “Victor’s Little Secret,” but Victoria’s Secret found that change
unsatisfactory and filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky. 55 Victoria’s Secret brought suit pursuant to the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C § 1051), the FTDA, and Kentucky common law,
alleging that the Moseleys committed trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 56 Only the FTDA claim will be discussed here, however,
as the other claims are not relevant.
Under the FTDA, to prove a dilution claim a plaintiff must show: (1)
its trademark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of
its trademark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use of its mark came
after the plaintiff’s trademark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s
use of its mark dilutes the quality of the plaintiff’s trademark. 57 In the
case sub judice, the only disputed element was whether the Moseleys
use of their mark diluted the quality of the plaintiff’s trademark. The

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003).
Id.
Id.
V Secret, 2000 WL 370525, at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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district court held there was trademark dilution for two reasons. 58
First, the court found that the two marks were sufficiently similar to
cause dilution by blurring. 59 According to the court, the Moseleys’
subsequent change to “Victor’s Little Secret” was not sufficient to
distinguish their mark from Victoria’s Secret’s trademark because an
examination of their signage and advertising revealed that their
alteration was very minor. 60 The word “Little” was substantially smaller
than the words “Victor’s” and “Secret,” and the court called it “an
afterthought in the advertising.” 61
Second, the court found that the similarity in the marks, combined
with the fact that the Moseleys’ mark was associated with unsavory
goods, caused dilution of Victoria’s Secrets trademark by tarnishment. 62
The court declared that while the Moseleys’ inventory (specifically the
sex toys) may not be unsavory to all, its more risqué quality widely
differentiated it from Victoria’s Secret. On those grounds, the court
granted summary judgment and enjoined the Moseleys from using the
mark “Victor’s Little Secret” on the basis that it caused dilution of the
distinctive quality of the Victoria’s Secret trademark. 63
2. Moseley II
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Moseleys
contended that the entry of summary judgment resulted from the district
court’s faulty analysis of the dilution question and from the court’s
failure to require proof of actual economic loss. 64 Prior to the Sixth
Circuit hearing the appeal, but after the district court’s judgment, the
Sixth Circuit adopted a five-factor test for establishing a dilution claim.
The test was essentially the same as the four-factor test used by the
district court, but the new test required the plaintiff to prove that its
trademark was not only famous, but also distinctive. 65 A trademark is
distinctive based on inherent qualities of the mark, the extent and
duration of its use in connection with goods or services, advertising and
publicity of the mark, the geographic area in which the mark is used, and
the channels of trade in which the mark is used and the recognition of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at *6.
63. Id.
64. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 469. “‘Distinctiveness’ is not only a statutory element, it also has a considerable
bearing on the question of whether the junior use will have a diluting effect.” Id. at 470 n.2.
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the mark within those channels of trade. 66
The Sixth Circuit noted that there was a circuit split over whether a
plaintiff had to show actual dilution or just likelihood of harm to sustain
a trademark dilution claim. 67 The court held that the “likelihood of
harm” standard was the correct standard because it found that “‘dilution
is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value of the mark.’” 68 According to the court, this passage
from H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 shows congressional intent to provide a
“broad remedy for the lesser trademark violation of dilution and
recognized that the essence of the dilution claim is a property right in the
‘potency’ of a mark,” and “evinces an intent to allow a remedy before
dilution has actually caused economic harm to the senior mark.” 69
The court noted that requiring proof of actual dilution would be
extremely difficult and would be disastrous to the junior mark’s owner
“who wanted to test the propriety of a new mark before launching it in
the marketplace.” 70 The court reasoned that if actual dilution was
required “the owner of a junior mark would have to wait until after they
had spent the resources involved in establishing a trademark in
consumers’ minds before they could even find out if their mark was
improper.” 71
3. Moseley III: The Case Makes It to the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court addressed the circuit split over whether the FTDA
required proof of actual dilution or just a likelihood of dilution. 72 The
Court first distinguished dilution from traditional infringement law by
finding that “unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and
are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.” 73
In holding that the FTDA required a showing of actual harm rather
than a likelihood of harm, the Court distinguished between federal law
and state antidilution statutes. Specifically, many state statutes
66. Id.
67. Id. at 474–75.
68. Id. at 475 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1032).
69. Id. at 475–76.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 421–22 (2003), superseded by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
73. Id. at 429.
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explicitly provided relief where there was a likelihood of harm, rather
than a completed harm. 74 The FTDA, however, only mentions that a
trademark owner is entitled to injunctive relief when another party’s use
of a mark “‘causes dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous
mark.” 75
In dicta, the Court noted that when marks are not identical, the mere
fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a
famous trademark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. 76
The Court found that mere mental association will not necessarily
reduce the capacity of the famous trademark to identify the goods of its
owner, which is the statutory requirement for dilution under the
FTDA. 77 Furthermore, the Court found that blurring and tarnishment
were not a necessary consequence of the mere mental association. 78
As applied to the facts of the case, the Court found that the army
officer who saw the advertisement of the opening of a store named
“Victor’s Secret” did make the mental association with “Victoria’s
Secret,” but it also showed that he did not form any different impression
of the store that his wife and daughter patronized. 79 There was no
evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria’s Secret
trademark to identify and distinguish its goods or services. 80 The officer
was offended by the advertisement, but it did not change his perception
of Victoria’s Secret. His offense was directed entirely at the Moseleys. 81
4. Congress Intervenes
After the Court entered its mandate on April 3, 2003, it remanded the
case to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 82 On April 9, 2003, the
Moseleys filed a motion in the Sixth Circuit to vacate the injunction, and
Victoria’s Secret filed a response. On July 26, 2007, more than four
years later, the Sixth Circuit finally remanded the case back to the
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. By this time,
Congress has enacted the TDRA. 83
Unhappy with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mosesly, Congress
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 432 (some sections of Lanham Act also refer to likelihood of harm).
Id. at 432–33 (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)).
Id. at 433.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id.
Id.
Id.
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (W.D. Ky. 2008).
Id.
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amended the FTDA with the TDRA, which only required a likelihood
of dilution to succeed on a claim. 84 As discussed in Part II, the TDRA
provides that:
the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another
person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous,
commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to
cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark,
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury. 85

5. Moseley V: The Case Returns to the District Court
The Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky found
that the TDRA was the controlling authority. 86 The district court found
there was no dilution by blurring because it is “defined as an association
arising from the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 87 And there was no
such association here because the only evidence proffered was the
Colonel’s letter. In this letter, the Colonel did indicate that he perceived
an association between the marks; 88 however, the Colonel also indicated
he was aware the two entities had no connection beyond the similarity of
the names. 89 The court suggested that while dilution by blurring could
occur under similar circumstances, the evidence here did not show a
likelihood of it occurring. 90
The district court did, however, find that there could be a likelihood
of dilution by tarnishment. 91 Dilution by tarnishment is an “‘association
arising from the similarity between a mark . . . and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.’” 92 Here, the army Colonel
was offended by what he perceived to be a bastardization of Victoria’s
Secret’s trademark for the sale of unwholesome, tawdry merchandise. 93
According to the court, the Colonel’s reaction suggested that there was a

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38.
Id. at 748.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 742 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006)).
Id. at 750.
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likelihood Victoria’s Secret’s reputation would be tarnished.
C. Moseley VI: The Decision
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit faced the sole issue of whether there was
dilution by tarnishment. 94 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the TDRA
“creates a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong
inference, that a new mark used to sell sex related products is likely to
tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between
the two” and that presumption had not been rebutted. 95 In support of the
creation of this rebuttable presumption, the court looked at a House
Judiciary Report that stated that “the Moseley standard creates an undue
burden” and concluded that this called for “special attention to the
‘burden’ of proof or persuasion placed on ‘trademark holders’ by the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moseley, suggesting a possible modification
in the burden of proof.” 96 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted a
growing body of case law, aided by the Restatement (especially
subsection g), “that the creation of an ‘association’ between a famous
mark and a lewd or bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the
famous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling power.” 97
In light of this, the Sixth Circuit held that any “new mark with a lewd
or offensive-to-some sexual association” creates a rebuttable
presumption, or a very strong inference, of tarnishment. 98 The court
compared this to a res ipsa loquitur type of effect, 99 where, although not
conclusive, the new mark owner provide some evidence showing that
there is not a likelihood of tarnishment in order to prevail. 100 The court
went on to list examples of what types of evidence could be offered by a
defendant, such as polls, customer surveys, and expert testimony. 101
The fact that the Moseleys did not provide any evidence rebutting the
presumption, especially in light of Congress’s dissatisfaction with
Moseley, supported the conclusion that the “present record—in the eyes

94. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604).
95. Id. at 385. This is not the only way the court formulates the standard. The alternative, and
more expansive, formulation is mentioned in the first sentence of the next paragraph.
96. Id. at 387.
97. Id. at 387–88.
98. Id. at 388–89.
99. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when by the very nature of the circumstances—in the
Moseley case two similar marks with some overlap in goods offered—an outcome is likely—in the
Moseley case the dilution of the senior mark.
100. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388–89.
101. Id.
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of the legislative branch—show[ed] a likelihood of tarnishment.” 102
The concurring opinion disagreed with the creation of a rebuttable
presumption of dilution. 103 Instead, because the TDRA was new law
and because of the vagueness of the legislative history regarding the
burden of proof, the concurrence argued that the rebuttable presumption
should simply be treated as an inference. 104
The dissent disagreed and argued that the burden should be on the
plaintiff and that in the current case, the burden was not met. 105 The
dissent also argued that the “undue burden” that Congress felt Moseley
created was more reasonably interpreted to mean a lightening of the
evidentiary burden from actual harm to likelihood of harm, rather than a
shifting of the burden from the plaintiff to the defendant. 106 The dissent
stated that most of the cases cited by the majority in support of a
presumption were distinguishable because in those cases the products
sold by the senior mark were easily distinguishable from those sold by
the junior mark. 107 Finally, the dissent argued that the presumption of
dilution could lead to illogical results. As an example, the dissent
pondered what would happen if the holder of a sex-related trademark
brought a dilution claim against a junior sex-related mark. The dissent
argued that there would still be a presumption of tarnishment despite the
similar sexual nature of both marks. 108 The dissent found this
unacceptable because it would be illogical to assume that a junior mark
could tarnish a senior mark of an equally sexual nature. 109
IV. DISCUSSION
This Part discusses three significant reasons why the Sixth Circuit
should not have shifted the burden to the defendant in dilution by
tarnishment cases where the junior mark has lewd or sexual associations.
Additionally, it demonstrates why a narrow interpretation of the TDRA
would have been more appropriate. Subpart A explains how the Sixth
Circuit’s approach to dilution cases is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s approach. Subpart B demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s
decision increases the potential for harm to consumers. Finally,

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 390 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 391 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391 n.2.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395 n.5.
Id.
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subpart C discusses other negative consequences of placing the burden
on the defendant.
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Is Not Consistent with an Important Part
of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Moseley that Was Not Affected by
the TDRA
The following excerpt from a House Judiciary Committee Report
states the purpose of the TDRA:
The Moseley standard creates an undue burden for trademark holders who
contest diluting uses and should be revised.
....
. . . The new language in the legislation [provides] specifically that the
standard for proving a dilution claim is “likelihood of dilution” and that
both dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment are actionable. 110

The Committee Report shows that Congress intended the TDRA to
make one specific change to the Moseley decision; that is, it was enacted
to reduce the burden of proof from actual dilution to a likelihood of
dilution. The Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley III, however, did
more than just require the plaintiff to prove actual dilution. It also
offered guidance on how to determine whether dilution exists or even if
it has the potential to exist. For instance, the Court stated that dilution is
not “a necessary consequence of a mental association” between a junior
and senior mark. 111 Even though the Supreme Court made this
statement in an opinion that adopted an “actual dilution” standard, this
statement is equally applicable to a case in which a “likelihood of
dilution” standard is used. This is so because it is logically impossible
for dilution to be a likely consequence of a mere mental association if
dilution absolutely cannot be a consequence of a mere mental
association.
The Court went on to assess the evidence presented by Victoria’s
Secret (which is the same as that presented in Moseley V 112 under this
framework). It found that the evidence showed nothing more than the
existence of a mental association because the Colonel’s ire was directed
only at the Moseleys for having a store name similar to that of Victoria’s
Secret, where the Colonel’s wife and daughter shopped. According to
the Court, the Colonel’s regard for Victoria’s Secret and its trademark
110. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 5, 9 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1094, 1097.
111. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003), superseded by statute,
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007).
112. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 385.
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were unaffected by the mental association. The Court gave no credence
to the fact that Victor’s Little Secret had, according to the Sixth Circuit,
lewd or sexual associations.
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley III extended far
beyond what Congress altered by enacting the TDRA. Moseley III
requires that a plaintiff present at least some evidence that the consumer
would think less of the senior trademark in order to move past a mere
mental association and further down the road toward a likelihood of
dilution. Additionally, because the Court did not consider the junior
mark’s lewd or sexual associations, even though those associations were
evident, they should have no influence at that point in the analysis. In
Moseley VI, the Sixth Circuit did not just ignore the mandate of the
TDRA when it decided to shift the burden of proof. It also snubbed the
Supreme Court when it based this shift merely on the existence of lewd
or sexual associations—a consideration the Supreme Court omitted
entirely in reaching its conclusion about whether there was anything
more than a mental association.
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Increases the Potential for Harm to
Consumers
From its outset, trademark protection law was primarily concerned
with consumer protection. 113 Trademark law “was concerned foremost
not with the senior user’s lost profits or the junior user’s unjust
enrichment, but instead with the consumers who were ‘duped into
dealing with an imposter.’ . . . ‘[T]he consuming public was an unnamed
third party in every action for trademark infringement.’” 114 Trademark
infringement law, however, had a significant shortcoming—in order to
bring a suit, the junior mark’s product had to be in direct competition
with the senior trademark’s product. 115 Therefore, it was lawful for
producers of goods not in the same market as the goods of a senior
trademark to benefit from the goodwill associated with the senior
trademark. 116
This flaw of trademark infringement law was a significant catalyst
behind the development of trademark dilution law. 117 With this

113. Klieger, supra note 19, at 795–96.
114. Id. at 799 (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications
of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160; Sidney A.
Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 528, 529 (1980)).
115. Id. at 800.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 801.
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expansion, however, came the possibility that the primary justification
for trademark protection would change from consumer protection to
something else. 118 That something else was proposed in Frank
Schechter’s seminal article, The Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection. In his article, Schechter advocated for a regime of
trademark rights in gross in which “‘the preservation of the uniqueness
of a trademark . . . constitute[d] the only rational basis for its
protection.’” 119 In reaching this conclusion, Schechter abandoned
trademark infringement law’s requirement that a consumer be confused
by the junior’s use of a senior trademark. 120 Schechter, instead, wanted
to protect any unique mark against any use of that trademark, essentially
arguing for trademark holders to have the same rights as holders of
copyrights, patents, and physical assets. 121 For Schechter, holders of
unique marks would have a property right in gross to their trademark. 122
Schechter’s proposal was seen as radical when his article was
published and was not immediately accepted by the judicial system. 123
Over a sixty year period, however, it slowly gained acceptance. 124 As
explained in Part II, dilution theory was initially adopted by several state
legislatures, and in 1996, it achieved nationwide status with the
enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The state antidilution
statutes, however, were met with hostility by the courts, and judges
narrowly interpreted their language, sometimes even ignoring the plain
language of the statute. 125 According to Robert Krieger, an attorney and
author of a leading article on trademark dilution, a significant reason for
this was that courts viewed these statutes not as protecting senior
trademarks from a preventable harm, but simply as thinly veiled
attempts to grant property rights in gross where they had not been
before. 126
These courts were justified in their apprehension. In addition to
antidilution statutes being a move away from the traditional consumer
protection justification, the granting of a trademark right in gross can
actually harm consumers by causing an undesirable anticompetitive
effect. This stems from the fact that many advertisers differentiate their
product not on quality, but on the ability of a brand’s image to appeal to
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 802.
Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 15, at 831).
Id.
See id. at 816.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 814, 817.
Id. at 817.
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the emotional, non-rational side of consumers. The more effective a
trademark is at appealing to this side of consumers the more appealing
the product is to them. And consequently, the owner of that trademark
can charge more for its product regardless of whether that product is of
higher quality than a competitor. This creates an environment where a
trademark owner has an incentive to invest in the ability of its trademark
to have this effect. Thus, trademark dilution law, which serves to
protect this investment, actually encourages overinvestment in the
development of the trademark. This can give the owner of a famous
trademark a monopoly-like power, because, even though a competitor
has the funds to create a product of equal or greater quality, it will be a
much more expensive and difficult proposition to break the
psychological hold that a famous trademark has over its consumers.
Without viable competition, the possessor of the monopoly power will
have no incentive to keep prices down or to maintain product quality,
which ultimately harms the consumer. 127
Additionally, it has been argued that the more property rights
trademark holders are granted the more transactional costs are imposed
on all parties. 128 Because increased property rights mean more lawyers,
longer product development time, and either more cost in developing
trademarks or having to use capital to license an existing trademark, the
cost of bringing a product to market, and therefore the end cost to the
final consumer, increases. 129
In 1996, the FTDA was passed and the owners of famous trademarks
were able to bring a dilution action in federal court without having to
show even the likelihood of consumer confusion. Consequently,
significant aspects of Schechter’s proposal had found acceptance on the
federal level, 130 and a trademark right in gross was now federally
guaranteed. 131 Contrary to the interests of consumers, Congress further
strengthened the rights of trademark owners when it lowered the
evidentiary burden to one of likelihood of confusion with the enactment
of the TDRA. With the Moseley decision, the Sixth Circuit has
expanded the power of trademark owners yet again by shifting the
burden of proof; thus, making it easier for a senior mark to bring a
dilution claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit has made consumers
127. See id. at 852–66.
128. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J.
1687, 1696 (1999).
129. Id.
130. The main difference between Shechter’s proposal and the FTDA was the size of the protected
class. Schechter wanted to define the class as “distinctive marks.” The FTDA defined the class as those
with “famous marks.” “Famous marks” is a smaller class than “distinctive marks.”
131. Kleiger, supra note 19, at 835.
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even more vulnerable to the harm stemming from the expansive rights
granted to trademark holders under federal dilution law.
C. Other Negative Consequences of Shifting the Burden of Proof
Dilution by tarnishment, in contrast to dilution by blurring, can
involve sometimes humorous, sometimes crude forms of ridicule,
parody, insult, or defamation. 132
Indeed, the fact situations of
tarnishment cases have been described as “often bizarre.” 133 In
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld Ltd., the junior mark was
selling pants for overweight women and calling the product “Lardache”
jeans. 134 In another case a junior mark used the slogan “Enjoy Cocaine”
in a way that mimicked Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coke” slogan. 135 A
defendant, who had a booth at an adult entertainment exhibition, was
enjoined from having two women sit atop a Viagra-branded missile. 136
The justifications for the outcomes in tarnishment cases are as
amusing (though not as varied) as their fact patterns, but for different
reasons. The International Trademark Association has said that the
results in such cases are often “dictated by a court’s eye-of-the-beholder
reaction and sense of humor (or lack thereof).” 137 Additionally, at least
one court has suggested that “whether a particular use constitutes
tarnishment can also vary depending on the times.” 138
The Sixth Circuit’s Moseley decision passes judgment on a specific
segment of tarnishment cases—those involving lewd or sexual
associations. In support of its decision the court points to a short survey
of tarnishment cases that, according to the court, indicate a consensus
among other courts that a junior mark with lewd or sexual associations
tarnishes a senior mark. While the court’s interpretation and application
of this litany of cases is questionable, a survey of these cases reinforces
the observations, cited in the previous paragraph, that the outcomes are
dictated by the mores of the deciding judge and the mores of society at a

132. U.S. Trademark Ass’n, Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 434 (1987).
133. Id.
134. 625 F. Supp. 48, 57–58 (D. N.M. 1985).
135. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
136. Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
137. U.S. Trademark Ass’n, supra note 132, at 434.
138. See, e.g., G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
aff’d, 210 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting that plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant’s use of its mark on
cigarettes and court refused to grant injunction stating that “the day has long passed when cigarette
smoking is considered offensive and sinful”).
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particular point in time. 139
Moreover, some of the cases also seem to indicate that a finding of
tarnishment by a judge is a highly circumstantial type of assessment. 140
It appears to be an approach similar to the one taken by Justice Potter
Stewart to obscenity—the “I know it when I see it” approach. 141
Whether this approach is acceptable is beyond the scope of this
Casenote. The fact of the matter is that judges do engage in this type of
reasoning. It might even be unavoidable given the subjective nature of
some (perhaps all) areas of law.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision takes away this discretionary function
because it takes away a judge’s ability to analyze the interaction
between the two marks and how that interaction affects consumers. 142
Additionally, it limits the inquiry to whether the junior mark has a lewd
or sexual association. It simplifies the inquiry. One might argue that
simplifying an inquiry that is based on the predilections of an individual
judge might be good for the justice system, and, generally speaking, this
is probably true. But here it is not. There are numerous reasons for this.
First, the presumption errs on the side of the senior mark. This is
inappropriate because, as discussed above, they already have a property
right in gross which is harmful to society, and any ruling that will make
it easier for them to enforce this right only exacerbates the problem.
Second, the presumption does not take into consideration the
characteristics of the senior mark. The image that the senior mark is
trying to protect can have a significant impact on the effect of the use of
an identical or similar junior mark. As the dissenting justice in the 2010
Moseley case pointed out, the presumption would not be appropriate if
the senior mark also had lewd or sexual associations. Indeed, in the
Moseley case, the supposed wholesome nature of the Victoria’s Secret
trademark was questionable.
Finally, given the fact that what is considered capable of tarnishing
depends on the times and the individual predilections of the judge, this
kind of presumption is essentially “locking in” the mores of this
139. This is indicated, in part, by the lack of objective reasoning behind the decisions. See, e.g.,
Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Friendfinder,
Inc., No. C 06-6572 JSW (MEJ), 2007 WL 4973848, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007); Kraft Foods
Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd.
P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet
Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
140. See, e.g., Kraft Food Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 949–50; Mattel, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1627; Polo Ralph Lauren, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048; see also U.S. Trademark Ass’n, supra note 132, at
434 (“[C]ourts will continue to make these subjective judgments on a case by case basis.”).
141. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
142. See, e.g., Kraft Food Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 949–50.
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particular judge and the mores of society at this particular point in time
for an indefinite period. Other societies, surely just as enlightened as
ours (and maybe more so) have a much less uptight approach to
sexuality. If, at a future date, our society has become more accepting of
sexual content, is it fair to subject it and the right to expression to an
outdated morality? 143
V. CONCLUSION
Almost seventy years have passed between the time when legal
scholars first discussed dilution and when it was finally adopted on the
federal level. During this significant span of time, only about half of the
states enacted laws protecting trademarks from dilution. Moreover, state
courts were very reluctant to apply those statutes primarily because the
power given to trademark owners by those enactments was
unprecedented.
Eventually, dilution law was created on the federal level with the
passage of the FTDA. The Supreme Court’s reaction to the dilution
statutes was similar to that of the state courts many years prior. That is,
the Court’s rhetoric in Moseley displayed an apprehension toward
dilution law and, consequently, it applied a narrow interpretation of the
FTDA. Congress disagreed with the main holding of the Supreme
Court’s Moseley decision and passed the TDRA, which states that a
party claiming dilution need only show a likelihood of dilution in order
to obtain an injunction. In 2010, the Sixth Circuit adopted a very broad
interpretation of this new statute when it decided to shift the burden to
the defendant when that defendant has a lewd or sexual association.
This burden shift is not provided for in the TDRA. Nor is it in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s tentative approach to dilution law—a
general approach that was not negated by the TDRA. Moreover, this
decision has three significant negative consequences. First, it increases
the potential of harm to consumers by making it easier for trademark
holders to enforce the already expansive power they have over their
trademark (i.e., a property right in gross). Second, it prohibits a
consideration of the characteristics of the senior mark which can
influence the alleged dilutive effect of the junior use of a mark. Finally,
143. It is possible that a judge will be able to exercise his or her own discretion later in the
proceedings when the defendant attempts to rebut the presumption. But this exercise of discretion will
probably be drastically different than one that begins without a presumption. Moreover, at that point the
presumption, and the morality that created it, have done significant damage. That is, the presumption
has increased the power of the senior mark because it has made it easier for the plaintiff to bring suit, it
has prolonged the litigation because the plaintiff’s burden is so minimal, and it has placed the significant
burden of proving a negative on the party that is generally less capable of bearing that burden.
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it imposes the mores of the judge who made this particular decision and
the mores of society at this point in time (as interpreted by this judge) on
the courts of the Sixth Circuit in an area of law that is highly subjective
and dependent upon an analysis of the interaction between the two
marks and the effect of that interaction on consumers. These significant
problems could have been avoided if the Sixth Circuit had adopted a
narrow interpretation of the TDRA and, consequently, had not shifted
the burden to the defendant. When interpreting federal dilution statutes
in the future, courts should recognize the issues raised here and seriously
consider using a narrow interpretive approach.
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